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I. God's Comeback in Philosophy 
A. Renewed Interest in Christianity 
In April 1980 Time magazine reported that "God is making a 
comeback ... in the crisp, intellectual circles of academic 
philosophers." The article surveys the quiet revolution in thinking 
which is currently taking place in philosophy. During the early part 
of this century, such philosophies as naturalism, positivism, 
empiricism, and existentialism gained widespread allegiance among 
professional philosophers. Unfortunately, these philosophies tend to 
view belief in God as either false or lacking in rational support. 
Roderick Chisholm from the Ivy League Brown University explains 
that this view has been so influential because "the brightest people" 
held it for years. However, Chisholm adds in recent years a number 
of "tough-minded" intellectuals have provided defense for religious 
belief, and have ushered the topic of God back into fruitful discourse. 
Most of them have a specific interest in the God of Christianity. 
Whereas it used to be thought irrational to believe in God, now 
many philosophers are claiming it is entirely rational. Of course, no 
genuine issue in philosophy is ever finally settled. Philosophers are 
forever trying to shed new light on enduring problems, and the same 
is true for the pro bl em of whether Christian belief is rational or not. I 
propose to take a look at what philosophers have been saying about 
this precise problem. The issue of religious belief is obviously very 
large and complex, so I will focus on just a few aspects of the overall 
problem. 
Michael L. Peterson is associate professor of Philosophy and 
head of the Department of Philosophy at Asbury College, 
Wilmore, KY. 
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B. The Structure of this Essay 
The issue of whether belief in God is rational has been approached 
in a number of different ways. One way is offering proofs or 
arguments for and against God's existence. Such arguments are 
taken to be the rational basis for either belief or disbelief in God. 
Those thinkers who believe the arguments for God's existence win 
out form the tradition of natural theology down through the 
centuries. Other thinkers who believe the arguments against God's 
existence tip the scales form the enterprise which we may call natural 
atheology. (At least this label is more charitable than calling it 
unnatural theology.) Our Christian heritage is greatly indebted to 
those who have tackled these kinds of problems, and I personally 
owe much of my own Christian position to their work. 
However, there is another way of approaching the question of 
whether belief in God is rational - a way which provides a stimulus 
for what I have to say. This second approach does not deal directly 
with the various grounds on which belief in God can be called 
rational. Instead it deals with the very standard of rationality by 
which such grounds are judged. Philosophers have offered a number 
of proposals for conditions which must be met in order for a belief to 
be rational. I will discuss two of these proposals and try to determine 
whether Christian belief is rational according to these requirements. 
The two requirements, which are distinct but closely related are: (I) 
A person may hold a belief only on the basis of having responsibly 
reviewed the relevant evidence; and (2) A belief must have sufficient 
evidence. The first condition pertains to the relationship between the 
person doing the believing and the proposition he believes. The 
second regards the relationship between the proposition believed and 
the evidence for or against it. 
C. Preliminary Distinctions 
At the outset, it is necessary to clarify exactly what aspect of 
Christian belief is being analyzed. As the title states, Christian belief 
is the general concern, but this is a vast subject which entails a 
number of interrelated beliefs. Therefore, this article will be 
restricted specifically to the question of belief in God. To center on 
belief in God is not to study any particular Christian doctrines as 
such, even though the validity of Christian doctrines is a fascinating 
issue in itself. However, it is discussed indirectly here, since belief in 
God is the foundation of all other doctrines. And belief in God is 
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logically necessary to orthodox Christianity. Unless belief in God is 
defensible, Christianity is not defensible. 
For present purposes, to talk about belief in God is to talk about 
the belief that God exists, i.e., the belief that the proposition "God 
exists" is true. Obviously, believing in God involves more than 
accepting a certain proposition as true. Belief in God in the full sense 
includes trusting God, committing one's life to Him, and living 
within His presence. But, if belief in God is more than acceptance of a 
proposition, then it is at least that. One cannot sensibly commit one's 
life to God, or thank God, or praise God without believing that there 
is such a person as God. Hebrews 11 :6 suggests this very idea. Hence, 
belief that God exists is fundamental to belief in God. And unless 
belief that God exists is defensible, trust in and commitment to God 
is not defensible. 
Having made the above points, I shall use the terms "Christian 
belief" and "religious belief" synonymously with "belief in God." 
Also I shall use "belief in God" interchangeably with "belief that God 
exists." The exact question I wish to address, then, is whether belief 
in God - belief in the existence of God - is rational. 
II. Rationality and the Ethics of Belief (first criticism) 
A. Intellectual Duties 
We are familiar with the accusation that religious belief is 
rationally deficient or defective. Critics have made this accusation 
from two somewhat different perspectives. One perspective is 
religious believers have neglected the responsibility of scrutinizing 
and evaluating their beliefs in light of the evidence. The other 
perspective is the objective evidence itself, regardless of whether 
believers have been conscientious about it or not, just shows that 
God does not exist. According to either perspective, belief in God is 
plainly irrational. Let us examine the first way of criticizing religious 
belief in this section and reply to it in the next. Also, let us reserve 
consideration of the second criticism for subsequent sections. 
The first formulation of the irrationality criticism exhibits an 
underlying conviction that there is an ethical responsibility which 
attaches to the human enterprise of believing. Ethically speaking, we 
have no right simply to believe anything whatever. We have the 
ethical duty to try to reach or approximate the truth. W.K. Clifford, 
a 19th century philosopher, tells a story to accent this fundamental 
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requirement: 
A shipowner was about to send to sea an emigrant-ship. He 
knew that she was old, and not over-well built at the first; 
that she had seen many seas and climes, and often had 
needed repairs. Doubts had been suggested to him that 
possibly she was not seaworthy. These doubts preyed upon 
his mind, and made him unhappy; he thought that perhaps 
he ought to have her thoroughly overhauled and refitted, 
even though this should put him to great expense. Before the 
ship sailed, however, he succeeded in overcoming these 
melancholy reflections. He said to himself that she had gone 
safely through so many voyages and weathered many storms 
and that it was idle to suppose she would not come safely 
home from this trip also. He would put his trust in 
Providence, which could hardly fail to protect all these 
unhappy families that were leaving their fatherland to seek 
for better times elsewhere. He would dismiss from his mind 
all ungenerous suspicions about the honesty of builders and 
contractors. In such ways he acquired a sincere and 
comfortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe 
and seaworthy; he watched her departure with a light heart, 
and benevolent wishes for the success of the exiles in their 
strange new home that was to be; and he got his insurance-
money when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales. 
Clifford asks rhetorically, "What shall we say of the shipowner?" 
Clearly, we shall say, "He is guilty of the death of those people." 
B. The Importance of Sufficient Evidence 
Granted, the shipowner sincerely believed in the soundness of the 
ship, or so we are told in the hypothetical story. But he believed in a 
manner which violates the ethics of the intellectual life. Actually, the 
shipowner had "no right to believe on such evidence as was before 
him." He had acquired his belief by stifling doubts and avoiding 
careful investigation. Clifford correctly indicates that even if we alter 
the story a bit and suppose the ship was not unsound after all, the 
shipowner is still as guilty as before. The question of right or wrong 
here does not have to do with the actual truth or falsity of the belief, 
but with the way in which the belief is attained and held. John Stuart 
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Mill made this same point in his classic essay, On Liberty. Mill states 
the truth may reside in the mind as a prejudice, or a superstition, and 
this is beneath the dignity of a rational being. A belief, even a true 
belief, may be acquired in the wrong way - not because it is 
responsibly evaluated and seen as true. 
According to the "ethics of belief" theorists, then, a belief ought to 
be held only on the basis of having found sufficient evidence. And the 
strength with which we hold any belief ought to be in proportion to 
the strength of the evidence. Presumably, if one is too busy or too 
untrained to investigate the grounds of a belief, then his proper 
attitude ought to be something like neutrality. As Clifford eloquently 
says, "Every time we let ourselves believe for unworthy reasons, we 
weaken our powers of self-control, of doubting, of judicially and 
fairly weighing evidence." An ethic of belief, therefore, is a procedure 
for guarding_ the mind from error and credulity. 
C. The Indictment of Religious Belief 
It is now quite easy to explain the kind of criticism of religious 
belief which is based on the ethics of belief. The critic says the believer 
is in violation of the moral requirements placed on believing, or the 
believer has adopted certain theological propositions without 
carefully examining the evidence for and against them. In a sense, 
this criticism is directed against the religious believer in his role as a 
believer, and not against what he believes per se. 
III. Is the Religious Believer in Violation of the Ethics of Belief? (first 
reply) 
A. Giving the Critic His Due 
What can be said in response to the critic who says the religious 
believer has violated or neglected the ethical conditions of believing? 
Has the believer failed to examine the evidence carefully and 
conform his belief conscientiously to it? Has he become so careless in 
his mental habits that he has fallen victim to wishful thinking, peer 
pressure, propaganda, or some other subrational force? The first part 
of our response to such questions should be to give the critic his 
proper due. The critic should be applauded for endorsing a general 
ethics of belief. Human beings are not totally free to believe just 
anything they choose. As responsible, rational, and moral agents, we 
must adjust our beliefs to the best reasons and evidence available. 
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The morality of our believing something is determined largely by our 
honest and energetic efforts to analyze the evidence, even if we are 
sometimes mistaken. 
The critic also seems to be correct in indicating that some religious 
believers are credulous people, defending themselves by saying their 
religious beliefs are private matters without any rational or ethical 
constraints. It's no wonder thoughtful nonbelievers sometimes 
characterize believers as persons who believe on fancy, push away 
doubts, and direct their minds toward the comfortable and familiar. 
Now, after giving the critic his due, what can be said in stronger 
defense of the rationality of religious belief? Two important defenses 
are in order: (I) We must point out a host of technical difficulties 
involved in formulating an exact ethics of belief, and we must 
emphasize that not all believers are out of the spirit of such a code 
anyway; and (2) We must insist that the critic is operating on the 
single principle of avoiding error while religious belief may be 
governed more by the additional principle of finding truth. Let us 
develop these defenses in more detail. 
B. Difficulties in Formulating the Ethics of Belief 
While it is quite legitimate to call for responsibility in believing, it 
is very difficult to formulate a clear criterion for fulfilling that 
responsibility. One problem arises with respect to the notion of 
sufficient evidence. Many philosophers say the ethics of belief 
require us to believe a proposition only on sufficient evidence. 
Supposedly, every meaningful proposition is capable of being 
justified or refuted by appropriate evidence. Yet spelling out the 
exact kind and amount of evidence which would be sufficient in any 
given case is a formidable task. For example, what kinds of evidence 
are relevant to theological propositions, and particularly to the 
proposition that God exists? Does pure intellectual argumentation 
count? Does personal experience or insight count? Do historical 
events count? Precisely what sort of evidence is valid so that one who 
considers the proposition "God exists" is ethically obliged to take 
account of it? 
To continue this line of questioning, how much evidence is 
sufficient or enough to justify any given proposition? How does one 
tell when the evidence he possesses is indeed sufficient? Obviously, 
there are times when one has an overwhelming amount of evidence 
for a belief or an overwhelming amount against it. But how do we 
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specify the exact point at which the evidence becomes sufficient? 
What about one who conscientiously thinks that he has sufficient 
evidence and yet is mistaken? Who has the prerogative of setting up 
this criterion of sufficiency anyway? 
The questions above reveal difficulties in articulating a precise 
code of ethics for believing. We can endorse the basic value of being 
concerned for evidence, but we cannot specify a formula for when 
this value has been properly displayed. Therefore, the moral 
evaluation of whether someone has done his intellectual duty, in 
conforming his belief to the evidence, is in the realm of fallible 
judgment and not in the realm of exact calculation. This means there 
is room for difference of opinion regarding the ethics of belief. In 
fact, we might add part of the general ethics of belief which we are 
discussing includes, not only evidential scrupulosity but, intellectual 
humility and tolerance as well. Without these other equally 
important intellectual virtues, the search after truth (which the critic 
wants to protect) is simply jeopardized in other ways. 
The moral here is that no one can dictate the precise point at which 
another person has weighed the evidence responsibly and is therefore 
entitled to believe. As long as a person makes a serious attempt to be 
reasonable and honest in his belief, we should be cautious about 
pronouncing him to be in violation of intellectual ethics. Thus the 
critic does not really possess a strict and absolute standard of ethics 
according to which the religious believer is clearly out of order. 
Furthermore, in spite of the difficulties surrounding a precise code 
of ethics of belief, many religious believers take great care to accord 
with the basic spirit of such an ethic. Not only do many lay believers 
want to be as reasonable as their ability permits, there is a whole 
tradition of Christian scholarship which has produced impressive 
reasons for belief in God. Therefore, the critic cannot justly make a 
blanket indictment that the religious believer is irrational because he 
has violated the ethics of belief. 
C. The Neglected Duty to Truth 
We have examined the critic's objection that Christians violate the 
ethics of belief. We have begun to see that a number of believers 
actually exhibit the intellectual virtue of reasonableness. But the dis-
cussion so far has been dominated by only one aspect of intellectual 
ethics - the duty to avoid error. There is another duty of the 
intellectual life - the duty to find truth. I think believers may find an 
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important method of rebuff for the critic by exploring this second 
duty. 
Initially, we must emphasize that these two duties are genuinely 
distinct. They are not just two ways of expressing the same duty. To 
fulfill one may not be to fulfill the other. All responsible thinkers 
must face the question of which of these twin duties has priority in 
case of conflict, for it will make a great deal of difference in how they 
operate in the realm of belief. W.K. Clifford, for example, 
emphasizes the avoidance of error and warns against believing 
anything without sufficient evidence. Clifford feels pathos when he 
says that an error or falsehood, once believed, is like a pestilence 
which can "master one's body and then spread to the rest of the 
town." Then he asks, "What would be thought of one who, for the 
sake of a sweet fruit, should deliberately run the risk of bringing a 
plague upon his family and his neighbors?" Clifford's point is 
permeated by the fear of error, which offsets the desire for truth. 
My question for Clifford and the Cliffordians is, "Are there not 
situations in which the chance of gaining truth outweighs the risk of 
error?" When one is sifting through the evidence for and against a 
contemplated belief, there may be no magical signal that he has 
acquired enough of the right kind of evidence and is therefore 
entitled to believe. One simply has to weigh the evidence to the best of 
his ability and then make a judgment to give or to withhold assent. If 
the desire or need for truth is strongly present, even when the 
evidence is not compelling, it is plausible to think that a person might 
go ahead and believe. 
Going ahead and believing is even more plausible if one assesses 
the risk factor differently from Clifford. Clifford seems to assume 
that if one refrains from believing on insufficient evidence he has 
eliminated the risk of error. This assumption, however, is not correct. 
The risk of gaining or losing truth, or of embracing or avoiding error, 
is present regardless of what attitude one adopts toward a 
proposition - whether he positively believes, positively disbelieves, 
or remains neutral. The Cliffordian insistence on sufficient evidence, 
well-motivated though it is, is hardly effective in eliminating risk. 
We can even envision special situations in which the proposition 
being considered for belief is so important that the Cliff ordian code 
cannot give adequate guidance at all. We might imagine a situation in 
which the importance of finding truth is quite great, even though the 
evidence is not absolutely definitive. The famous American 
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philosopher William James considered the type of situation in which 
the Cliffordian fear of error is neither practical nor possible. James 
speaks of decisions about what to believe which are (in his words) 
"living," "momentous," and "forced." For James, as well as for a 
great many people, decisions about religious beliefs are precisely of 
this sort. They present us with situations in which we cannot avoid 
some kind of decision, and hence cannot protect ourselves from risk. 
It does not matter which way we believe - we risk falling into error 
and also risk losing the truth. 
Having drawn up a scenario in which a decision about belief is 
living, momentous, and forced - and yet in which the evidence is not 
conclusive either way -we can now understand why the duty to seek 
truth might take priority over the duty to avoid error. This may well 
be the kind of situation in which many religious believers find 
themselves, and hence their choice to believe in God is not only 
understandable, but justifiable. A bout the only qualification on such 
a choice is that the person involved responsibly consider the evidence 
and the alternatives, and that the evidence be in some way adequate 
for the decision. But the rigid Cliff ordian standard is quite useless in 
these situations. So, according to a more complete ethics for 
believing - an ethics which includes a duty to find truth - a person's 
decision to believe in God may be entirely compatible with his 
epistemic duties. 
IV. Rationality and the Available Evidence (second criticism) 
A. The Need for Evidence 
We have just been considering a criticism of religious belief which 
focuses on the relationship between a believer and the belief that he 
holds. There is a second, but related, criticism which focuses on the 
relationship between the belief held and the evidence for or against it. 
Most philosophers say that any proposition which is believed must 
be based on appropriate evidence. The actual evidence, then, is the 
ultimate court of appeal, regardless of how conscientiously one 
reviews it. Just as a person can be criticized for not going through the 
proper process of forming a belief, the belief itself can be criticized 
for not measuring up to the evidence. 
This second type of criticism is the one we now want to examine 
with respect to religious belief. The critic may say either that belief in 
God is not supported by available evidence or that it is straight-
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forwardly falsified by the evidence. This kind of criticism is fairly 
common in the history of philosophy. The brilliant British 
philosopher, Bertrand Russell, was once asked what he would say if, 
after dying, he were brought into the presence of God and asked why 
he had not been a believer. According to Russell, "I'd say, 'Not 
enough evidence God! Not enough evidence'!" I suppose that each of 
us could have some fun speculating how such a reply would be 
received! But Russell held, as many people have, that belief in God is 
irrational because there is insufficient evidence for it. Let us explore 
this criticism a little further. 
B. What Is It for a Belief to Have Evidence? 
Just what is it for a belief to have evidence or grounds? For our 
purposes, it is for one proposition, namely, the belief, to be justified 
by one or more other propositions. These other propositions already 
have some favored status in one's thinking and hence can be used to 
guage or measure the acceptability of other propositions. To cite 
proposition Bas evidence for proposition A, then, is to indicate that 
one believes A on the basis of B, which he already believed. As an 
example, consider two propositions which provide evidence for a 
third. 
(I) John is a Hoosier, and (2) Nine out of ten Hoosiers can play 
basketball. Thus, supply evidence for the proposition. (3) Probably, 
John can play basketball. 
Evidence, as we now see, is simply some propositions offered to 
support other propositions. It is irrational to believe any proposition 
for which there are no pre-propositions which can be offered as a 
proper support. 
C. Evidence and Foundationalism 
As we continue to think about some propositions supporting 
others, we may ask whether the supporting propositions in turn have 
support, i.e., whether the evidence itself has evidence. Of course, this 
is a legitimate question. Many philosophers say this is exactly how 
knowledge and belief is structured - that there is a series of 
propositions in which each one is supported by others. In terms of 
our previous example, the proposition (I) John is a Hoosier, which 
served as evidence, may, in turn, rest on the propositions, ( 4) John 
filed an Indiana tax return last year, (5) John cheers for Indiana 
University sports, and (6) John frequently hums "Back Home Again 
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in Indiana." These last three propositions now serve as evidence for 
the preceding one; and each of these three could rest on further 
propositions, and so on. 
However, a number of philosophers think we cannot just keep 
citing evidence for evidence for evidence indefinitely. As these 
philosophers see it, the process of citing some propositions to 
support others must come to an end. We must come to certain 
propositions for which there is no further evidence. Presumably, 
these propositions will be the most general, most basic, and most 
important propositions that all mankind believes. Although 
philosophers have differed somewhat over which and how many 
propositions form the foundations of human knowledge, there is 
much common agreement. The proposed list of such propositions 
frequently includes: the beliefs that self exists, other persons exist, 
material objects exist, there has been a past, etc. Such special 
propositions have been called the/ oundations of knowledge; and the 
philosophers who view knowledge in this way are called f ounda-
tionalists. Philosophers who seem to hold some form of founda-
tionalism include Aristotle, Aquinas, Thomas Reid, and G.E. 
Moore; I am also inclined to interpret Clifford as some sort of 
foundationalist. 
When we adopt afoundationalist view of knowledge and envision 
the rest of our beliefs somehow resting upon a secure basis, we can see 
that no talk of evidence is complete unless it includes one's total set of 
beliefs reaching all the way down into the foundational beliefs he 
holds. When we ask about the evidence for or against a proposition, 
we ultimately want to know how that proposition fares with respect 
to all of the relevant propositions in one's storehouse of beliefs and 
not just with regard to a select few. Belief in a proposition would truly 
be irrational, we should think, if it did not square with the total 
evidence available in our set of beliefs. 
D. Another Indictment of Religious Belief 
It is now easy to see how a critic might use foundationalist thinking 
to say that religious belief is irrational. He might not want to bother 
with the weaker criticism that belief in God is disconfirmed by some 
beliefs in our noetic structure. Instead he might advance the stronger 
criticism that belief in God is disconfirmed by our total set of beliefs, 
or at least by the balance of our beliefs. But more pointedly, belief in 
God is unacceptable in light of the foundational beliefs we hold. 
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V. Is Religious Belief Contrary to Available Evidence? (second reply) 
A. Giving the Critic His Due - Again 
The criticism that religious belief is irrational became it does not 
have support by our overall structure of knowledge cannot be easily 
dismissed. In fact, there are a number of considerations which force 
us to take the criticism seriously. For one, the whole idea of belief 
having foundations is an attractive and often helpful theory. For 
another thing, it seems true that some religious believers cite weak or 
irrelevant evidence for their belief in God, making it appear perhaps 
that there is no better justification. However, the persistent critic will 
probably not be satisfied with only this mere concession. 
B. F oundationalism and Atheism 
The zealous critic will want to state his charge in the strongest 
possible way: that the foundational propositions on which all other 
human beliefs rest entail that God does not exist. The contemporary 
philosopher, Antony Flew, makes this point in his treatise, The 
Presumption of Atheism. Flew thinks that the common and normal 
belief structure of mankind is such that it discredits belief in God. 
Hence, belief in God is irrational. Since the presumption, according 
to Flew, is in favor of atheism, the heavy burden of proving God's 
existence rests squarely upon the shoulders of the believer. 
C. Difficulties with Foundationalism 
The question of whether the atheistic proposition "God does not 
exist" is included in or implied by the foundations of human belief 
meets with several difficulties. These difficulties are best understood 
as specific instances of larger and more general difficulties with 
foundationalism itself. To begin, there is a problem in specifying 
exactly which propositions are properly incorporated into the 
foundations. There is certainly no unanimous agreement about these 
propositions, and there is clearly no accepted criterion whereby we 
can detect the right propositions. There are some rough guidelines, to 
be sure: We suppose these basic beliefs to be relatively few in number, 
to be entailed by all or some of our other subsidiary beliefs, and so 
forth. But beyond this, nothing seems very definite. 
Now the critic needs for the foundations to be very clear for his 
accusation to stick. He needs to be able to say that the proposition 
that God does not exist is in the foundations, or at least that it can be 
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deduced from foundational propositions. But as long as different 
people might have important disagreements regarding the 
propositions which they count as basic, the critic cannot move so 
unilaterally against religious belief. According to the foundations of 
some people's beliefs, belief in God may be perfectly legitimate. 
Admittedly, according to the foundational beliefs of other people 
(e.g., Flew) belief in God may be ruled out. But this fact about the 
differences in what we count as basic is merely biographical 
information and not grounds for saying that belief in God is 
irrational with respect to the foundations of human knowledge. 
D. God and Foundationalism 
We have shown that there is no necessary reason to think belief 
that God does not exist is in the foundations of human knowledge. 
Now what can we say about whether the belief that God does exist is 
in the foundations? It appears that we must say that belief in God is 
not included in the foundations any more than it is excluded from 
them. As far as a typical list of our most basic beliefs goes, neither 
belief nor disbelief is necessitated. While this may at first sound a bit 
unsettling to the devout believer, I think that it is really more faithful 
to the Christian picture of how people come to belief in God. 
Granted, the Bible says that all men somehow have a consciousness 
of God or a belief in God. But it does not give us a philosophical 
analysis of whether this belief is foundational in the technical sense 
with which we are concerned. 
For a proposition to be foundational, we must remember, it can 
serve as evidence for other propositions, but it is accepted without 
evidence. There are clear biblical passages which intimate that there 
are various evidences for God's existence, and which men may 
recognize if they will. These passages can readily be interpreted by 
the categories we have been using. To say that there is evidence for 
God's existence is to say that certain propositions about ourselves, 
the world, and so forth - together with our foundational beliefs -
provided support for believing that God exists. This puts the 
Christian in the position of having to consider those evidences and 
recommend them to others. Belief in God, then, just like disbelief in 
God, cannot simply be a presumption or assumption for which we 
need have no evidence. But this means that belief in God is not in the 
foundations. 
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E. The Tradition of Natural Theology 
So far, we have shown that belief in God is not irrational and that 
this belief is subject to evaluation by both favorable and unfavorable 
evidence. But we could press on to argue that belief in God is 
positively rational, that it is in fact confirmed by the evidence. A 
great many religious believers cite various evidences to support their 
position: that the world must have had a cause; that someone had to 
design the complex and orderly universe we have; that they have had 
a personal experience with the transcendent source of all creation; 
and so forth. Moreover, there is an inveterate tradition which has 
sharpened and sophisticated these kinds of arguments so that even 
the best of minds have had to take notice. This is the tradition of 
natural theology. The Time magazine story cited earlier follows the 
continuing attempts made by Christian philosophers to give rational 
support to religious belief. 
Now I am not insinuating that such arguments and evidence 
compel just anyone and everyone who considers them to accept belief 
in God. No argument in any area oflife (religion or otherwise) can do 
this. Neither am I pretending that there are no arguments and 
evidences brought against belief in God by thinking persons. There is 
the problem of evil in the world, the problem of the meaning and 
verification of theological language, and other arguments which 
seem to support disbelief. 
What I am claiming is the arguments and evidences which thinking 
believers have developed certainly prevent the critic from stating that 
religious belief is outright irrational according to the evidence. The 
state of the debate over God's existence is just not that simple. All 
thinking people must sift and weigh the evidence for themselves. 
What thinking believers have done is to point out the legitimacy of 
sorting out the evidence to support belief in God. Hence, their efforts 
give us a clear right to say that belief in God's existence is rational. 
VI. Vindication of Christian Belief (conclusion) 
In closing, what shall we say in response to the primary question 
which constitutes the title of this paper? Is Christian belief rational? 
Of course, what we have done here is to look at only one aspect of this 
complex question, but a very fundamental aspect at that: Is belief in 
God's existence rational? We have seen what philosophers are saying 
about the rationality of any belief in general and about religious 
belief in particular. 
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We have discovered the accusation that belief in God is irrational 
has force only when arbitrary or impossible standards of rationality 
are employed. Under close analysis, we find the most familiar 
standards of rationality are not capable of being captured in precise 
formulas. We have found religious belief fares reasonably well on the 
incomplete but important criteria of rationality that we do have. We 
have reaffirmed - with some new appreciation - a number of 
believers abide by a general ethic of ration< 1ity and provide 
impressive evidence for their religious position. 
Therefore, I offer an answer to our initial question. There is no 
necessary reason to think that Christian belief - in so far as it rests 
on belief in God - is irrational. Instead, there are good grounds for 
claiming that it is indeed rational. 
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